This paper unifies the following existing formal theories: Universal Intelligence Measure, Spacetime-embedded Intelligence, Observer Localisation. The unified theory provides a new simple agent framework. This new framework is then used to address philosophical questions about the simulation argument, the doomsday argument, personal identity, and ethics.
Prerequisites

Universal A Priori Probability
In the early days of Artificial Intelligence the pioneer Ray Solomonoff searched for a scheme to extrapolate a given bit sequence. For instance the sequence 011011011011011... should be continued with a zero. He wanted his scheme to extrapolate bit sequences of arbitrary sophistication. He solved this problem by defining the Universal A Priori Probability M also known as Solomonoff Prior. M (x ) is defined as the Probability that a universal monotone Turing machine U provided with a random program will output a string that begins with x . It is usually written as:
−|p | , where p are minimal programs for which U outputs a string x * which starts with x and | p| is the length of p . The Universal Prior assigns high probabilities to "simple" strings and low probabilities to random strings. Bit sequences can be extrapolated by applying Bayesian inference to the Universal Prior, this is then called universal induction [Sol64] . For every computable probability distribution over bit strings x, the expected prediction errors stay finite [Sol78] [Hut01]. Universal Induction can be seen as a formalisation of Occam's Razor combined with Epicurus' principle of multiple explanations. The Philosophy of Universal Induction itself has been discussed extensively by Rathmanner and Hutter [RH11] .
We will also be using the similarly defined Algorithmic Probability m(
where U is a universal prefix Turing machine and the sum is taken over all p , for which U halts and outputs x . And finally we define m( x | y ) := ∑ p : U ( p y) = x 2 −| p | .
Space-time-embedded Intelligence (STEI)
The agent framework used for AIXI suffered from "unrealistic" assumptions such as perfect memory, giant amounts of computational resources and the inability to modify itsself. In order to build a more realistic theory of intelligence Laurent Orseau and Mark Ring recently introduced a new agent framework called "Space-time-embedded Intelligence" [OR12] . They recursively defined the expected total utility V ( π 1 ) :
where π is a possible sequence of policies, u is the utility function, γ is the horizon function and ρ is a probability distribution function.
Observer Localization (OL)
In order to find the shortest description of our universe, multiverse theories have been developed. A fatal flaw of these theories is their lack of predictive power, due to the large number of universes. This poses an epistemological problem, which Marcus Hutter solved by showing the following: In addition to the description of the universe (Theory of Everything) we should also include the description of how to extract our subjective experience from that computed universe. 
Unification
Interpreting STEI
In this section we are going to simplify notations of space-time-embedded intelligence slightly.
In the context of a human agent, a policy π t would be an encoding of the state of the human brain, detailed enough to represent the strategy of that brain. Humans are reinforcement learning agents, where the utility u (π 1: t ) equals the pleasure minus the suffering in the brain state π t . So it makes sense if the utility function only depends on one instead of many policies, i.e., we simplify by replacing the notation u (π 1: t ) with u (π t ) . Based on STEI: Given a sequence π the total utility is ∑ t γ t u(π t ) , where π is a possible sequence of policies, u is the utility function and γ is the horizon function. We denote the expected total
Interpreting OL
Hutter gives the data stream coming from our visual and other sensory nerves as an example of subjective experience [Hut11] . This works well with a dualist model like AIXI. But consider a scenario where the visual cortex is damaged: Now the subjective experience is different from before, even though the visual sensory input is still the same. Another scenario: The memory is altered by an external manipulation. Now we have to say that the agent observes his own memory and has to decide, which ones of those memories are accurate and which ones are not. So the observation of his own memory is part of the subjective experience of the agent, but memory is spread throughout the entire thinking parts of the brain. Both scenarios show that the data stream coming from our sensory nerves is not a sufficient characterisation of the subjective experience of a space-time-embedded agent. Instead we should define the subjective experience as an encoding of the current state of the brain itself. This is further supported by the notion, that the brain can be decomposed into many small pieces, which can themselves be seen as agents [Min88] . So the information travelling within the brain can be seen as sensory inputs and outputs travelling between small agents, which shows the connection to Hutter's initial example.
Unifying UIM, STEI and OL
As we have seen in the previous sections, for humans, both the policy in STEI and the subjective experience in OL are encodings of the state of the brain. So for the rest of this paper we are going to treat the policy and the subjective experience as one and the same thing and call it a mind-state. To give a better description, I will borrow some words from Eray Özkural [Özk12] : A mind-state "stores the same functional organisation of cognitive constructs", as the brain/computer it represents. It is the "logical structure of experience". Analogous to how the Universal Intelligence Measure has been constructed, we now too want to use the Universal Prior M , in order calculate the total expected utility of an agent. As Hutter already pointed out, the CToE should be chosen according to the Occam's razor principle, which we can replace by algorithmic probability or the Universal Prior M . This means that the a priori probability of a CToE p being correct equals 2
, where |p| is the length of p . And the a priory probability of a mind-state-sequence
, where p are minimal programs for which U outputs a string x * which starts with x .
The new framework
The a priory probability distribution over mind-state-sequences is given by the Universal Prior. We can also express this in other words: The sequence of mind-states π is produced by a simple universal monotone Turing machine U provided with a random program, generated by fair coin flips. From now on we will use π as a random variable for mind-state-sequences. We denote the t-th mind-state of π as π t . If we additionally know one of the mind-states, we can use the Bayes theorem to update the probabilities and get an a posteriori distribution over mind-state-sequences. More formally expressed: Given the index t and the mind-state a , using Bayes theorem, we conclude that the updated Probability of the mind-state-sequence
where
Here we assumed that t was known. But the agent himself can not know for sure at which position t his own current mind-state a is located within this sequence, so we introduce the random variable T . A priori T is independently distributed from π , so we need to choose the a priori distribution P (T =t ) . We choose Algorithmic probability m(t) =: P (T =t) . This gives us the following probability:
This is enough to address the philosophical problems from sections 3.1 to 3.3 , but for the rest of the paper we need some more thoughts: Given the current mind-state a , the updated probability of
As in STEI we want to calculate the total expected utility
We do this using the distribution ρ := P( π =x * | π T =a) , so the total expected utility of a is
3 Applications in Philosophy
Human mind-states
Before we address the philosophical problems of simulations, doomsdays, teleportations, and ethics, we are going to point out some important properties of human mind-states. It has been estimated that a human brain contains around 100 Petabytes of useful information. So we assume the size of a human mind-state to be similarly large. If we randomly assemble a mind-state, then the Kolmogorov complexity of that mind-state should be expected to be very large too. But a mindstate of a human that really existed throughout history, has a much smaller Kolmogorov complexity, because its shortest description is a CToE, which is very much smaller than 100 Petabytes. The shortest program which outputs such a human mind-state is a CToE, which can be decomposed into two parts: ToE and OL. The ToE is a program which outputs all physical events within the universe. We denote the output of the ToE as φ . The OL is a program which extracts the mindstate or a mind-state sequence π from the physical data φ . This is important because algorithmic probability m(a) = Θ (P (π T =a)) is governed by the shortest programs which generate a . For simplicity we will only work with one φ instead of many. So for the following sections we assume
, where g is a specific constant.
Simulation Argument
There is the possibility that posthuman civilisations will use super computers to run realistic simulations of their ancestors, so called ancestor simulations. Nick Bostrom concluded, that if we expect, that throughout history there will be much more simulated human lives than real human lives, then we should expect, that we ourselves are living in a realistic simulation [Bos03] . Let A be a mind-state random variable and let S and R be the sets of all mind-states of simulated humans respectively real humans, that live throughout history.
Naively one might assume
, but in this section we will derive a better formula
and use it, to show that Bostrom's final conclusion is not entirely correct.
For posthuman civilisations it will still be infeasible to run a perfectly accurate simulation of every physical event that occurred in their universe. So if they run a realistic ancestor simulation, it must be a computationally efficient and very sophisticated simulation. Since they do not simulate every physical event, simulated history will not be identical to real history. Therefore, given a mind-state, it would be possible to tell whether that mind-state belongs to a real human or a simulated human (assuming that there is enough computational power to do so). The simulator is part of the real universe too, so the shortest CToE that outputs mind-states of simulated humans, contains the same ToE as the shortest CToE that outputs mind-states of real humans. But the OL of simulated humans can be very different from the OL of real humans.
The substrate is the type of physical devices, where the mind-states are located. Examples for substrates are biological brains and electronic processors. Let Z be a large set of mind-states which are all located on the same substrate. Based on our new framework we get:
where AM is an arithmetic mean and φ is the output of the ToE. We define the substrate dependent factor of Z as sdf (Z ) := AM a ∈Z m(a | φ) . We get a better formula for the probability ratio:
In the same manner we can derive the probability that we live in a simulation:
It could be that the sdf of biological brains is much larger than the sdf of computationally efficiently simulated brains. In this case the large numbers of simulated people could be compensated by the small sdf of simulated people. Depending on the computer architecture, also the opposite could hold true. I leave it to future papers to determine the ratios between sdf of different substrates. 
Doomsday Argument
When working on the doomsday argument, Bostrom stated the Strong Self-Sampling Assumption: "Each observer-moment should reason as if it were randomly selected from the class of all observer-moments in this reference class." [Bos02] We change this to: Each observer-moment (or mind-state) a should reason as if it were randomly selected with the probability P (π T =a) . Based on this, it should be decided whether the doomsday argument is valid or not. I suspect it to be invalid, because the probability that a is human, might scale approximately linearly with the number of real human mind-states.
Personal Identity
It is an equivalence relation which tells us whether two entities are the same person or not. Derek Parfit used a teleportation thought experiment to discuss the properties of personal identity. A teleporter is a device, which scans your body, while disassembling it fast enough, so you do not notice anything. The scan information is then sent to the destination and used to reassemble your body out of new matter. In his thought-experiment, using this technology, Parfit travels to Mars at the speed of light. The following text is a quote from his philosophy book [Par84] : "Simple Teletransportation, as just described, is a common feature in science fiction. And it is believed by some readers of this fiction, merely to be the fastest way of travelling. They believe that my Replica would be me. Other science fiction readers and some of the characters in this fiction take a different view. They believe that, when I press the green button, I die. My Replica is someone else, who has been made to be exactly like me." So the main question here is, whether teleportation kills people or not. In this section we will formalize this question based on our new framework. Recall the definition of the total expected utility V (a) :
Given the current mind-state a we now define the weight of a mind-state b as
Now we can write the total expected utility of a more elegantly:
Parfit argued that personal identity should be a gradual function instead of an equivalence relation [Par84] . Because w (b | a) tells us how much we should value the utility of a certain mind-state b , the function w (b | a) already is the right function to represent personal identity. In order to calculate if teleportation kills, we have to compare the following two scenarios:
Tele: A is the mind-state of a human one day before being teleported and B is the mindstate of that same human one day after being teleported.
Stay : A and B are mind-states of the same human two days apart and he was not teleported within those two days.
Following ratio tells us how much personal identity is lost trough teleportation:
If this ratio is close to one, the teleporter actually transports persons to Mars. -If this ratio is close to zero, the teleporter just kills persons and creates new persons.
It is unlikely that there ever will be teleporters for humans, but this theory will become relevant, as soon as there will be intelligent agents on electronic devices, which can travel to an other place, using the internet as their teleporter. The theory will also be relevant, when they will be making multiple copies of themselves.
Universal Algorithmic Ethics
Weight and Similarity
A horizon function γ t still needs to be chosen. For maximal farsightedness one could choose universal discounting γ t = 2
, as suggested by Hutter [Hut05 page 170]. We will use a slightly different version of universal discounting: γ t := m(t) , it inherits the main properties of the original version. Özkural suggested to use mutual algorithmic information I K (a ; b) to describe the similarity between two cognitive systems [Özk12] . A similar approach would be, to use the Universal similarity metric aka normalized information distance NID( a , b) [LCL04] . In this section we show that the weight w (b | a) is roughly proportional to m(b | a) , and show how this relates to mutual algorithmic information and to the universal similarity metric.
where h is a specific constant. We can use this result to show the relation of the weight w to the similarity measures: , b) ) , where I K (a ; b) is the mutual algorithmic information and NID( a , b) is the normalized information distance. We conclude, that the amount of similarity between two mind-states is positively correlated with the weights, that they assign to each other.
Resolution Independence
We used a ratio between weights to address the philosophical problem in section 3.4. and we will be using such ratios in the next section as well. So here we are going to discuss an important property of ratios between weights of the form
. When we introduced the concept of mindstates, we did not exactly specify how physically accurate or how abstract such representations ought to be. The level of detail or accuracy, we will call resolution. For all mind-states in this section, we assume the resolution to be high enough, for a mind-state to contain enough information, such that its shortest description is a CToE. In this section we will show that the weight ratios stay roughly the same across a wide range of resolutions. Let a , b , and c be mind-states at a very high resolution, e.g. molecular level, and let a ' , b ' and c ' be the same mind-states, but at a much lower resolution, e.g. mentalese level. Those mind-states correspond such that m(a ' |a) = m(b ' | b) = m( c ' | c ) holds, because the low-res mind-states can be computed based on the corresponding high-res mind-states, using the same program for all three cases. Based on this equation and given that the low-res mind-states are distinct enough amongst each other, we get the following equation, where f is some constant:
Using this equation and the approximation w (b | a) ≈ h⋅m( a , b) m(a ) derived in section 4.1 , we get the following relation between the weight ratios of different resolutions:
The just derived relation
suggests that there is a large range of different resolutions, which all result in roughly the same weight ratios. As we will see in the next section, decisions of rational agents strongly depend on such weight ratios, and are therefore resolutionindependent for a large range of resolutions.
Rational Game Strategies
We call an agent rational if he aims towards maximizing the total expected utility
. The weight w (b | a) tells us how much we should value the utility of another mind-state b , while having the mind-state a . We could also use the weight to calculate how much we should value the utilities of mind-states of agents other than ourselves. This is a theory of ethics which we get as a by-product of our simple initial assumption that mindstates are produced by a simple universal Turing machine with a random program. Analogous to the names Universal Induction, Universal Algorithmic Intelligence, Universal Intelligence Measure, and Universal Similarity Measure, we call our theory Universal Algorithmic Ethics. It is universal in the same sense that those other theories are universal and holds across different resolutions. In this section we introduce a useful abstraction of Universal Algorithmic Ethics and provide an example of how game theory can be transformed. We introduce the human mind-state random variables A , B , C ∈ R . They are not independently distributed as described in the following two sentences.
A and B are mind-states of the same human at different points in time. B and C are mind-states of different humans at the same point in time.
. I leave open how exactly A , B , C should be distributed, since the choice of the distribution probably does not influence Λ very much. The simplest would be a uniform distribution over all possible triples which are consistent with the sentences above. Λ can be seen as a constant value of humankind which should be determined in future papers. Since Λ is based on a fraction between weights, it would also be resolution independent. If a rational human is taking a decision while his mind-state is A and this decision will affect the utilities of his own future mind-state B and someone else's future mind-state C , then he would take an egoistic decision if Λ is close to zero, or take a utilitarian decision if Λ is close to one. We summarize our abstraction of Universal Algorithmic Ethics in the following two lines:
